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THE LIBEL TORT TODAY
RANDALL

P. BEZANSON*

Just as Alexander Bickel once accused the Warren Court of imagining
the past and remembering the future,' so it is with the libel tort. My purpose
in this essay is to "take stock" of the libel tort: to remember the past and
assess the present so that we have a firm basis upon which to imagine the
future. The past quarter-century has seen dramatic evolution of the libel
tort, and it is now time to step back from that experience and assess the
tort anew.
The subject of this essay is the changed libel tort. 2 The libel tort has
experienced profound change throughout its long and often arduous history.3
Indeed, change is perhaps more characteristic of the tort than constancy.
The change on which I will focus is that which has transpired over the past
quarter-century. 4 Unlike many past changes in the tort, which have been
profound but focused on specific elements of the cause of action such as

* Professor of Law and Dean, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13 (1970). Bickel
attributed the phrase to L. B. Namier. Id.; see L. B. NAMIER, CONVIcTs 70 (1942); see also
E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 162 (1962).
2. My principal focus in this article is libel law in the context of mass communication.
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that the common law tort may persist largely
untouched by constitutional privileges in the private libel setting. The private libel area seems
to be governed by a concept of publication of essentially private, commercial, or special
purpose information to a defined and strictly limited audience. This is a concept more akin
to that of common law privilege than to a general rule of publication. The principal case in
which the private libel concept has been applied is Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), which involved a libel in a credit report. Some language
in the Greenmoss opinion suggests that the concept of commercial speech underlies the private
libel approach. The difficulty with attaching significant weight to the commercial speech aspects
of Greenmoss is that, by the Court's own standards, the information communicated in that
case, if true, would be of clear public value. In any event, a conclusion based on the
commercial character of the offending statement would have to be the product of much more
elaborate analysis than that announced in the Greenmoss case.
A waiver or contract theory might better explain the private libel distinction, but even
within the confines of the transaction between the parties, which anticipates that one of the
parties will act on the information, it is hard to understand the essentially unexplained
conclusion that no first amendment interests exist as to the communication between Dun &
Bradstreet and the purchaser of the information. It is perhaps sufficient to say, for present
purposes, that the contours and rationale of the private libel cases remain to be explored in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Whatever the rationale, it appears at this point that the
scope of the private libel category is so narrow in its probable application as to be de minimus,
and perhaps irrelevant to the present or future libel tort.
3. See Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99; Veeder, The History
and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COL. L. REv. 3 (1904), 3 COL. L. REv. 546 (1903).
4. The beginning point, for my purposes, is the United States Supreme Court's 1964
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the defense of truth and expanded fact-finding authority of the jury,5 the
recent wave of change has reverberated throughout all of the central elements
of the tort, fundamentally altering its character. The principal engine of
change has been external to the tort itself, and the result has been revolutionary rather than evolutionary change.
In taking stock of today's libel tort, I will focus on four central elements
6
of the cause of action: reputation, compensation, publication, and privilege.
Each element has experienced fundamental change, if not radical reformu-

lation, over the roughly twenty-five years of development since New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 My purpose is not to sanctify the common law,

nor to condemn today's libel tort. My objective, instead, is to remember
the common law, to trace the past quarter-century of change, and to identify
the libel tort today. My conclusion is unsettling. The libel tort has changed
from an action to compensate for damage to reputation caused by an

unprivileged publication, to an action to impose a penalty on media for
general publication in an irresponsible manner of an injurious and false
factual statement about an individual or entity.
I.

a.

LIBEL AND REPUTATION

A Brief History of the Common Law Tort

Libel law always has had a peculiar, and often problematic, relationship
to reputation. 8 In part this is because reputation is an elastic as well as a
time- and culture-bound concept. Almost from its inception the libel action
principally was associated with protecting the reputation or inviolability of

government and the ruling classes, including feudal lords, monarchs, and
the church. 9 The phrase "the greater the truth, the greater the libel"' was

5. See supra note 3; Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on
Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1964).
6. The elements of the defamation tort are variously stated, and there is wide room
for interpretation as to the specific meaning of each element, however the elements are
expressed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976); Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 747 (1984) (noting varying meanings of
reputation and compensation); Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CAu. L. REv. 691 (1986) (noting varying meanings of reputation).

7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. As Dean Pressor put it: "It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great
deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities
for which no legal writer has had a kind word. .. ." W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]; see Anderson, supra
note 6, at 747-48; Post, supra note 6, at 691.

Robert Sack, whose exceedingly able book LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS
reflects his comprehensive knowledge of libel law in all of its dimensions, has been even more
graphic. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS (P.L.I. 1980); text accompanying
infra note 50.
9. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 840 & nn.4, 5; Veeder, supra
note 3. In his article, Veeder indicated that the libel tort preceded the rather infamous form
of action in the Star Chamber, where its principal thrust was protection of government from
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simply a terse way to express this central function of the original tort.
From these none-too-benign origins, the reputational interests reflected
in the tort evolved. The movement from protection of authority and power
from criticism toward protection of a broader range of individual reputational interests, and then toward protection of the individual's interests in
community reputation, was gradual. Over the course of these changes, the
tort was democratized; that is, the interests represented became more universally applicable to all citizens, and the imbalance between the state as
the original claimant of protection and the citizen, who was first the object
of the action before becoming its beneficiary, was corrected.
While the tort's evolution along these lines was tortured and gradual,
three factors most contributed to the democratizing trend. The first was the
defense of truth, which until rather late in the tort's long history was not
available. The defense of truth wrested away the foundations upon which
rested the tort's function of protecting rulers against criticism." The defense
of truth also symbolized a broadening of the tort's societal function: the
action was now for a defamatory statement that could not be justified in
truth, a formulation that reflected a more universal interest in freedom of
the individual from wrongful and damaging characterization. Class boundaries were even further eroded by the second and more recent development:
the abolition of seditious libel. 2 No longer could government be libeled.
The focus, instead, was on individual persons and their reputational interests. Finally, the burden of proof on the defense of truth may have
contributed to the tort's democratization-although by accident, as the
-burden of proof rules were largely remnants of the earlier regime. Placing
the burden of proof of truth on the publisher of a libel made the libel
action more accessible to individuals by effectively tipping the balance in
favor of the defamed individual, who needed only to prove publication,

seditious, or critical, utterance. In its earlier form it appears to have existed in local courts
and in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction as an action to vindicate the reputation of the individual
citizen in his or her community. Interestingly, the remedy in this early form of action was not
money damages, but apology. Relatively little is known about the specific form and use of
this action, although Veeder indicated that it appeared to have been used frequently, largely
as a means of avoiding the necessity of duels or other types of vengeance, and as a means of
penance, thus reinforcing the church's moral influence. As Veeder put it, the remedy was
directed toward the moral misconduct of the speaker, not toward curing the harm to the

defamed individual. See Veeder, supra note 3; see also Anderson, supra note 6.
10. Prosser attributes this maxim to Lord Mansfield. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
supra note 8, at 840 & n.6.
11. See supra note 9.
12. Commentary and analysis pertaining to the repeal of the Sedition Act in this country,
and to the larger question of the rejection of the concept of seditious libel, abound. Perhaps
the most influential interpretation is found in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78 (1964). Other writings on the subject particularly
emphasize historical materials. See L. L-vy, LEGACY OF Su.PREssioN (1960); L. LEY, FREEDOM
oF rH PRss (1984); Anderson, The HistoricalOrigins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev.
455 (1983); Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FoUND. RES.
J. 521.
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defamation, and harm, a task the associated rules of libel per se and general
damages often made even easier. 3
This is not to say that the common law libel tort ever completely was
democratized, even in its fullest bloom. While the reputational interest
evolved from protecting government from the governed to protecting the
individual citizen's interest in "good name" in a relevant community, the
tort's practical operation remained elitist. Libel actions almost always were
employed by persons of sufficient influence or stature to make it worth
their while to file suit; success in litigation, particularly the amount of
money recovered, was directly related to a person's stature, wealth, and
influence. In effect, therefore, the less one needed money to compensate
for reputational harm, the more money one could recover. 4 Access to the
legal system was not free, and publishers could still "stonewall" in the
belief that relatively poor plaintiffs would not be able to bring suit, even
if the publisher was aware of an error. After all, in an era of increasingly
commercialized mass communication, publishers had a stake in their reputations, too. They still do. While "reputation" at common law was a broad
and elastic concept, the types of statements that received the greatest
protection, such as allegations of adultery, dishonesty in business or incompetence in professional affairs, and the like,' 5 had a distinct upper-class
bias. Finally, the tort's actual operation fell far short of consistently limiting
its protection to freedom from unwarranted damage to reputation. The
effective presumption of falsity at common law no doubt protected some
reputations that were, in fact, undeserved. It was, however, "reputation"
6
that was being protected by the common law, not truth.'
The common law tort also was attended with a complex and intricate
set of privileges that further limited its practical operation and therefore
restricted its universal application to all instances of individual reputational

13. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 840-42; R. Sack, supra note

8, at 129-42.
14. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 842-45; Anderson, supra note
6, at 747. There was some hope that the requirement that plaintiffs show actual damages as
a precondition to recovery under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. might temper damage awards,
especially by limiting the availability of general damages, which juries could presume and
award without any direct proof. This appears not to have occurred, however, as actual damages
under Gertz include such open-ended and incalculable matters as humiliation and embarrassment. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Anderson, supra note 6, at

756-58.
15. The special degree of protection accorded defamations pertaining to certain subjects,
such as unchastity, crime, honesty in business and professional matters, and the like, arose
initially in the slander tort, where the ordinary rule of presumed damage did not apply, and
actual damage to reputation had to be proved, except in these per se categories. While they
were not, as such, relevant in the libel setting, the influence of the per se categories also was
felt in the libel tort context. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 788-97; R.
Sack, supra note 8.
16. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 840-42; R. Sack, supra note
8, at 129-42.
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harm. 7 For present purposes, the important point about the privileges is
that they did not, as a general rule, affect or alter the nature of the
underlying reputational interest. 8 The privileges typically were grounded in
specific and limited settings in which the value of the challenged expression
clearly outweighed the admitted harm to reputation, or in which the harm
to reputation was strictly confined and therefore minimized when balanced
against other social interests. 9 While complex and intricate, therefore, the
privileges generally left the value and nature of the reputational interest
unaffected; in theory, at least, there was no suggestion that in certain
settings, or with certain classes of persons, reputation was less important
or entitled to a different measure of legal respect.
Notwithstanding its many imperfections, by the 19th Century the libel
tort was focused on community-based reputational or good name interests
of the individual citizen, it was widely available and largely free of rigid
and strictly circumscribed social class distinctions, and it was available to
remedy injuries to a wide range of reputational interests. The libel tort
applied equally to the integrity of governmental officials, the competence
of a practitioner, or the success of a football coach. When combined with
the availability of the contingency fee in this country, the rules of evidence
and the burdens of proof were decidedly cast in the citizen-plaintiff's favor.
The tort reflected the individual's interest in a community's perception of
the plaintiff, 20 and concomitantly protected the dignity and autonomy of
the individual in a larger and more complex society.
b.

The ConstitutionalPrivileges and Their Impact On Reputation

The common law of libel has been dramatically altered by a new and
broadly-applicable set of privileges tied to the first amendment. 21 The
privileges were first announced in the 1964 United States Supreme Court
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,22 and were based on the
principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and

17. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 815-38.
18. See id. at 815, 824-25. This is implicit, of course, in the very concept of "privilege"
at common law, given its situation-specific character.
19. See id. at 815-38 (succinctly summarizing privileges).

20. The common law libel tort was "relational" in character. That is, it was not concerned
with a plaintiff's own feelings, as such, except as an element of "parasitic" damages. Although
harm to feelings, alone, may be cognizable under other torts, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the defamation tort, by contrast, is concerned with the opinions or
perceptions of others in a community-that is, the plaintiff's good name as it relates to other
persons and as it may be affected, in their minds, by a publication. See PROSSER AND KEETON
on Torts, supra note 8, at 771; R. Sack, supra note 8; Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L.
Rv.35 (1936); Veeder, supra note 3.
21. The following discussion is drawn from R. BEZANSoN, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI,
LIBEL LAw AND THa PRss: MYTH AND RAITY 2-3 (1987) [hereinafter LIBEL LAW AND THE
PREss].

22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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wide-open. ' 23 Free and uninhibited expression, declared the Court, must
extend to matters of self-government and to "issues about which information
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.'"'2 In the libel setting, the command of the first
amendment requires a rule that protects some falsity in order to assure that
truth is neither punished nor deterred; the innocent mistake, therefore,
should be free of liability lest publishers be deterred from publishing facts
as they know them, at least with respect to public issues and public persons.
These purposes of the speech and press guarantees are effectuated
through a set of constitutionalprivileges applicable to all libel suits involving
publications in the media or in any form that is likely to reach general or
nondifferentiated and nonspecial purpose audiences. 25 The privileges, while
complex and often intricate, take three basic forms. First, all libel plaintiffs
must prove that the offending statement was actually false as a precondition
to recovery. 26 Second, any libel plaintiff also must prove that the offending
statement was published negligently; that is, that the publication was unreasonable in light of what the publisher knew or should have known about
its truth or falsity at the time of publication. 27 Third, libel plaintiffs classified
as public figures by virtue of their public position or association with a
controversial public issue must establish a higher level of fault than negligence. These public plaintiffs must prove that the publisher acted with
actual malice; that is, that the statement was published with knowledge of
its falsity, or recklessly in light of serious doubts actually entertained about
falsity at the time of publication. 28 The negligence and actual malice privileges are fault privileges that focus on the subjective state of mind of the
publisher at the time of publication.
The effect of the constitutional privileges is to make it more difficult
for a plaintiff to succeed in a libel action involving media publication, and
even more difficult if the plaintiff is a public official or a person who
wields significant public influence. The privileges reflect a judgment that
robust debate on public matters should be encouraged, and a companion
judgment that the reputational interests of public persons require less
protection in view of their public, rather than private, positions.
The effect of the constitutional privileges on the reputational element
of the libel tort has been fundamental. While the common law privileges
did not affect the libel tort's underlying concept of reputation, the constitutional privileges have altered the very nature of the reputational interest.
This has occurred in two principal ways. First, the constitutional requirement
that the plaintiff prove an offending statement's falsity has limited the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
376 U.S.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

Id.
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
254, 279-80 (1964).

19881

LIBEL TORT TODAY

interest squarely to that in "true" reputation. 29 The protection only of
"true" reputation substantially limits the universe of reputational interests
that may claim protection, for many, if not most, reputations are in some
measure undeserved. At the same time, the central relevance of a statement's
falsity effectively has broadened the protected interest from that in outwardlooking, or extrinsic, community-based reputation to an inward-looking, or
intrinsic, freedom from psychic or emotional harm to the individual. 0 In
effect, the balance struck at common law between the community's perception and the individual's personal dignity has been subtly shifted. No longer
is protection of individual dignity as clearly limited only to cases in which
community perceptions are also affected. Indeed, evidence of community
perception of the plaintiff and community interpretation of the offending
3
statement plays a decidedly secondary role in the adjudication process. '
Issues of reputational harm and defamatory interpretation, if addressed,
increasingly are considered matters of law for the judge, and instances of

recovery in the absence of community-based reputational harm seem to be
increasing. 32 Falsity is substituting for, if not swallowing up, reputation.

The second way in which the constitutional privileges have altered the
underlying reputational interest is through the requirement that a plaintiff
prove fault to recover in libel. The tort's recent focus on fault-negligence
or recklessness in light of what was known about falsity or truth at the

29. The requirement that a plaintiff prove falsity was announced in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). The exact scope of the Hepps rule, and its precise
meaning in terms of the types of proof of falsity that can support the required finding, are
unclear, especially in the nonconstitutionalized private libel setting discussed in note 2, supra.
While plaintiffs did not usually bear a burden of proving falsity prior to Hepps, and while,
before Hepps, few libel cases clearly addressed the truth issue, as such, subjective falsitywhat was believed about truth at the time of publication-was then, and remains today, a
pervasive issue in essentially all cases subject to constitutional privilege. Accordingly, falsity
was a principal focus of the libel suit prior to Hepps (even though subjective falsity), with
similar limiting consequences on the meaning of reputation. The change in the meaning of
reputation predated Hepps, therefore, although for somewhat different reasons. See LMEL
LAw AND THE PRESS, supra note 21, at 191-97.
30. This was also a problem at common law, largely because of the presumption of
harm to reputation and the open-ended measures of general damage. See PROSSER AND KEEroN
ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 794-97, 842-45; Anderson, supra note 6. A shift in the tort's focus
toward falsity will accentuate this problem, as it even further will loosen the constraints
imposed by the tort's relational focus. Falsity is not a relational concept, and the harm
stemming from it need not, in contrast to reputation, be relational in nature. For a most
insightful discussion of the nature and meaning of reputation in the libel tort, see Post, supra
note 6.
31. For an extended discussion of the respective roles played by falsity and reputation
in the litigation process, with discussion of cases that appear to involve recovery in the absence
of community-based reputational harm, see LmEL LAw AND Tmn PREss, supra note 21, at 183200; see also Anderson, supra note 6; Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better
Alternative, 74 CAuin. L. REv. 847, 853-56 (1986).
32. LmEL LAW AND r= PRESS, supra note 21, at 295 n.69; see also Anderson, supra
note 6.
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time of publication 3 3-has become a dominant focus of the lawsuit, including
at trial. 34 A plaintiff who succeeds in proving fault may often, as a practical
matter, have made a sufficiently powerful showing to convince a trier of
fact that both falsity and reputational harm have been established, without
more. 5 In other words, proof that a fact was published in the face of
serious doubts about its accuracy may make practically unnecessary any
proof that the fact was actually incorrect, and may sufficiently anger the
trier of fact that independent proof of reputation and actual injury in the
relevant community is mere surplusage.
Of equal importance to the nature of the underlying interest in reputation, however, is the systematic effect of limiting recovery to cases in
which both reputational harm (in its common law sense) and fault must be
shown. Because a showing of fault often may substitute for an independent
showing of harm to reputation, cases involving reputational harm may
become only a subset of cases in which fault is present, rather than the
converse. Put differently, recovery in litigation is not principally limited by
proof of reputational harm, but rather it is limited by proof of fault. Most
reputational harm goes uncompensated; proportionally more instances of
negligent or reckless publication are compensated to the extent that fault
can substitute for a showing of reputational harm.3 6
The failure of the constitutionalized tort systematically to reflect interests
in reputation as opposed to responsible journalism is magnified by the types
of reputational injury that tend to be protected. Because the fault privileges
tend to be sensitive to matters of context, such as deadline pressure, coverage
of public figures, and the like, and because the privileges quite explicitly
are predicated on strengthening the protection of speech on public matters,
recovery is less likely in the very cases deemed most deserving of protection
at common law. Recovery for injury to the reputation of public figures-a
category that includes, although is not limited to, the wealthy and powerful
whose protection was greatest at common law-is much more difficult than
recovery for injury to the reputation of a private individual.3 7 While the

33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); RESTATEmENT
(Second) of Torts § 580B comment h (1977).
34. For a discussion of the role of fault in the actual adjudication of libel suits, as well
as the impact of the fault showing on questions of falsity and reputational harm, see LIBEL
LAW AND T=E PRESS, supra note 21, at 104-07, 118-27, 191-200; Barrett, supra note 31, at

853-56.
35. See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y.),
remanded, 538 F.2d 311 (2d. Cir. 1975); see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767 (1986); LIBEL LAW AND Tm PRESS, supra note 21, at 191-97 & n.69.

36. For a more thorough discussion of this argument, see

LIBEL LAW AND

m

PRESS,

supra note 21, at 182-219.
37. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 349-50 (1974). Actual success
rates are consistent with the higher privilege obstacles for public plaintiffs. See LIBEL LAW
AND Tm PRESS, supra note 21, at 112-27; Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation
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common law, as noted earlier, was imperfect and somewhat class-biased in
its greater protection of the wealthy and powerful, it is nonetheless likely
that, as a rule, the greatest reputational damage to a career or to an
economic livelihood will occur with such persons. If this proposition is
accepted, the conclusion seems inescapable that the constitutional privileges
to the very cases in which
have limited the instances of the tort's operation
s
the least reputational harm has occurred.
The cumulative impact of the constitutional privileges has been subtly
but radically to change the "reputational" character of the libel tort. The
common law tort was premised on harm to reputation. Today the tort
protects against injurious falsehood. The common law tort was extrinsic in
nature and focused principally on individual reputation in the community.
Today the tort is largely intrinsic, with the dominant focus on falsity and
the individual's resulting emotional harm. At common law a chief focus in
litigation was disparagement of reputation. Today the chief focus in litigation is on the responsibility of the publisher. The common law concept
of reputation largely has been submerged by, if indeed it has not entirely
succumbed to, the constitutional emphasis of falsity and fault. Plaintiffs
whose reputational interest was most protected at common law face the
greatest obstacles to recovery and succeed least often. More fundamentally,
recovery by any plaintiff is more likely to be the product of chance than
of any systematic pattern reflecting reputational interests.
II.

LIBEL AND COMPENSATION

At least in its more recent common law form, the goal of libel law has
been compensatory; punishment and deterrence have been secondary objectives.3 9 This is implicit in the strict liability character of the libel tort, for
through strict liability the action reflected the idea that what was important
was whether someone was hurt, not why or by whom. 4° Punitive damages
required an additional evidentiary showing by a plaintiff, and one that was
quite distinct from the types of proof required to support the underlying
4
action. '
To be sure, the common law's success in isolating its compensatory
purposes often was obscured by the peculiar and complex elements of the
tort and burdens of proof on damages. For instance, the rule of strict
liability, which foreclosed the publisher from escaping liability because of

Study, 1981 AM. B. FouND. RFs. J. 795 [hereinafter Franklin, Suing the Media]; Franklin,

Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FouND. REs.
J. 455 [hereinafter Franklin, Winners and Losers].
38. See LIBEL LAw AND TE PRESS, supra note 21, at 193-95.
39. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 842-47; Anderson, supra note

6.
40. See PROSSER
note 8.
41. See PROSSER

AND KEETON ON TORTS,
AND

KEETON ON TORTS,

supra note 8, at 804-05, 814-16; R.
supra note 8, at 845-47; R.

Sack,

Sack,

supra

supra note
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inadvertence or absence of fault, represented an explicit social judgment to
place the risk of loss on the risk-taking publisher. 42 This undeniably had
the effect of deterring or inhibiting publication; indeed, this was the very
purpose of the strict liability rule, for the publisher was in the best position
to avoid the harm in the first instance. But the deterrence function of the
common law did not disguise the compensatory goal of the tort. It coexisted
with and supported the compensatory goal.
A second way in which the compensatory function of the tort often
was obscured was the measure of damages. Apart from punitive damages,
which rested on a special showing, the remaining compensatory damages
were governed by rules that, while understandable, often led to awards
whose relation to compensation were problematic at best. Many libels
required no proof of damages whatsoever, but instead left the jury a largely
unconfined discretion to place a value on the non-economic and often purely
internalized and emotional injuries which befell the libel victim. 43 Even if
proof of "actual" damages was required, the measure of such damages was
sufficiently elastic as not to pose a large barrier, and upon proof of such
actual damages as humiliation and suffering, the open-ended "general
damages" were available."
The damage rules were a common-sense product of the fact, intuitively
known at common law and recently confirmed in the present day, 45 that
actual economic damages ordinarily do not flow from a libel, and if they
do they often are impossible to prove. Instead, the damage caused by libel
is truly reputational and relational, and its manifestations are deeply personal
and psychological, not financial."6 The common law, however, attempted
compensation for such injuries in money, and of course the libel tort is
hardly unique in this respect. The result was that damage awards often
would bear no relationship to or foundation in actual economic harm, and
therefore would appear arbitrary and partake of punishment. This was so
even though the measure of such general damage awards was the plaintiff's
loss rather than, in the case of explicitly punitive awards, the publisher's
pocketbook. And the element of punishment was indeed present, for it is
one thing to award damages on the ground that the publisher is in the best
position to avoid the harm, and quite another to say that the publisher

42. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 804-05, 814-16.
43. Id. at 842-45; Anderson, supra note 6.

44. See PROSSER

AND KEETON ON TORTS,

supra note 8, at 842-45; Anderson, supra note

6.

45. See

LIBEL LAW AND THE

PRESS, supra note 21, at 19-29, 78-95; Barrett, supra note

31; Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REv.
809 (1986) [hereinafter Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment]; Franklin, Good Names and Bad
Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
Franklin, Good Names].
46. For information on the types of injury experienced by libel plaintiffs, and the reasons
they sue, see LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 21, at 6-18, 78-95; see also Anderson,
supra note 6; Barrett, supra note 31; Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment, supra note 45;
Franklin, Good Names, supra note 45.

1988]

LIBEL TORT TODAY

bears not only the burden of avoiding harm, but the burden of unforeseeable
impact on the victim's emotional stability as well.
The fact that the rules of damage as well as the rule of strict liability
made the compensatory objective of the libel tort unapparent in some
instances did not change the tort's basic compensatory character. Strict
liability and compensation are perfectly compatible, and the imperfections
of translating psychological and reputational harm into money were neither
unique to the libel tort, nor so fundamentally problematic as to undermine
it. The fact was and remains today that money is a necessary medium in
the legal system, and at common law there was no obvious logical alternative. Because falsity of an offending statement was neither an element of
the tort nor a precondition to recovery of damages, a nonmonetary remedy
of correction did not make sense. 47 Legally cognizable harm could flow
from a true or nondisprovable statement as well as a false-statement because
the legally protected and compensated interest was reputation, not injurious
falsehood.
The constitutional privileges have transformed the remedial function of
the libel tort from compensation for relational harm to compensation for
emotional distress and punishment of irresponsible publication. This change
has been subtle, and is a matter of degree, not of kind. At common law
proof of relational harm was a precondition to recovery for a broader array
of personal emotional harm. Today proof of falsity, not of relational harm,
is the only real precondition to recovery. Moreover, the role of compensation
in the remedial function of today's libel tort is secondary, not primary.
Indeed, particularly in the public libel cases, the dominant function is
punishing irresponsible publication, and any compensatory function, even
for emotional harm, is distinctly secondary. The reasons for these changes
are threefold.
First, today the libel action is dominated by the issues of falsity and
fault. The dominant focus of the law, and the principal focus in litigation,
is not the impact of a libel on community-based reputation. Instead, the
focus is on the falsity of the offending statement, its personal consequences
to the individual, and the negligence or malice of the publisher in light of
what was believed about a statement's truth at the time of publication. In
view of this, it is hardly surprising that a jury's remedial focus would be
influenced by considerations of fault, and would be shaped by a cleaner
and more objective, yet remedially more open-ended, finding of falsity
rather than the more ambiguous and circumstantial, yet remedially more
48
circumscribed, judgment of harm to reputation.
One might posit, however, that fault should not distort the jury's
compensatory function, for just as the deterrence implicit in strict liability
was compatible with compensation, a higher threshold of fault-based deterrence also should be compatible with compensatory objectives. The problem

47.

PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,

48. See supra notes 31, 34.

supra note 8, at 840-42; Anderson, supra note 6.
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with this line of reasoning is that deterrence based on strict liability is
widely systematic. That is, it applies across-the-board to all cases, and
requires no special evidentiary showing. Fault-based deterrence has neither
characteristic. It does not apply across-the-board, but only to a subset of
the cases in which defamation and harm have occurred. More importantly,
fault requires a special evidentiary showing, and that showing bears no
logical relation either to the existence of reputation or to the presence or
measure of harm to reputation. 49 This makes it very likely that extraneous
fault-based factors that dominate the trial will bear on the jury's compensatory determination, and makes a shambles of any systematic pattern of
compensating reputational harm. As Robert Sack has expressed it, "[t]he
few plaintiffs who succeed resemble the remnants of an army platoon caught
in an enemy crossfire. Their awards stand witness to their good luck, not
to their virtue, their skill, or the justice of their cause. It is difficult to
perceive the law of defamation, in this light, as a real 'system' for protection
of reputation at all." 50
The final impact of the constitutional privileges on the compensatory
purposes of libel law results from the de facto, if not de jure, coincidence
of proof of liability and proof of punitive damages. The coincidence is
explicit in the public figure libel cases, in which it has been held that
punitive damages may not be awarded except upon a showing of actual
malice, a showing that is also a precondition to liability itself in such cases. 51
While the required showing of common law malice has not been eliminated
as an additional obstacle to punitive damage recovery if a state's underlying
common law requires it, even in such cases proof of actual malice will
almost always, as a practical matter, satisfy the common law standard of
malice as well. In public cases, therefore, a jury's decision on liability
automatically will carry with it the availability of punitive damages, and
the juries are so instructed. The risk is great in such cases that compensation
and punishment will not only become intertwined issues, as they are in the
negligence-based fault cases, but that they will become identical issues, and
that both the jury and the plaintiff's lawyer will find the largely unconfined
discretion of punitive damage awards to be more hospitable than the more
circumstantially confined, and reviewable, determination of compensatory
damages. 52 In effect, the constitutional privilege rules have made public
figure libel claims all-or-nothing games, with punishment rather than compensation being the dominant consideration in shaping a remedy, and with
punishment being the sole explanation for the results achieved if the cases
are judged on a systematic level.

49. The fault showing concerns the publisher's state of mind with respect to the truth
or falsity of a statement at the time of the statement's publication. See LIBEL LAW AND THE
PREss, supra note 21, at 191-200; Barrett, supra note 31, at 853-56.
50. R. Sack, supra note 8, at xxvi.
51. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson v. Jacobson, 14 Media L. Rep. 1497 (7th Cir. 1987).
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A final point should be made about the impact of the fault-based
constitutional privileges on the compensatory function of the libel tort. The
fact that money remains the medium of libel remedies has facilitated the
influence exerted by the fault privileges on the jury's decisions about harm
and its compensation. Yet this is, upon reflection, a strangely incongruous
result in a tort now based on falsity. When the interest reflected in the tort
was reputation, the common law damage remedy was understandable because nonmonetary remedies logically were impossible. When the interest
reflected in the tort became protection against injurious falsehood-whether
the injury be limited to reputation or, as today, to a broadened array of
predominantly intrinsic, emotional harm-the need for money damages as
a medium of compensation became less evident. Indeed, in an ironic way,
this is reflected in the very conduct of parties to libel suits today. For many
plaintiffs, and particularly for the public plaintiffs, the act of bringing suit
itself may achieve both reputational and psychological compensation. What
remains of such cases after suit is brought is a straightforward action for
punitive damages. In terms of the plaintiff's interests, therefore, the jury's
role may be utterly irrelevant to compensation.
III.

THE PUBLICATION

REQUIRMEMENT

At common law, a plaintiff bore the burden -of proving publication as

an element of the libel tort.5 3 The requirement generally was not onerous,

but it served at least two functions beyond the obvious one of establishing
that the communicative tort was, indeed, communicative. The first function
was to provide a framework within which to judge questions of privilege.
Communications between husband and wife, for example, or between em54
ployer and employee in the employment setting, were usually privileged.
Proof of the form and setting of publication was necessary to define the
potential privilege issues.

The second and more basic function of the publication requirement was
to define the relevant community in which the claimed reputation existed,
and to set evidentiary boundaries on the proof of disparagement or reputational harm.55 The libel tort was relational in character; it was based on
a reputation perceived by others, and on harm to that reputation in the
eyes of others. If publication occurred in a community in which the plaintiff
had no reputation, and therefore could experience no diminution of reputation, there would be no actionable libel. Likewise, if the plaintiff had a
reputation in a particular community, but the disparaging statement either
was not published in that community or was not believed or construed to
be disparaging, no harm to reputation in that community would have
56
occurred, and no libel action would lie.

53.
54.
55.
56.

See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 780-83, 797-802, 815-39.
Id. at 824, 828-32.
Id. at 797-802.
Id. at 779-85.
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The common law publicatton requirement served these essential and
highly discriminating functions of defining the ambit of common law
privilege and constructing the meaning of words quite effectively. Both of
these functions of the publication requirement have been undermined by
the constitutional privileges of falsity and fault. While we have not normally
considered these changes as relating to the publication element, their impact
is best understood in that context.
The principal effect of the constitutional privileges has been to change
the focus of the publication element from a fact-specific and circumstantial
element to a monolithic and categorical one. The constitutional privileges
have created a general division of the publication concept between libels in
private or limited publication settings and libels occurring in mass communication settings. 7 Libelous statements whose publication is quantitatively
limited and whose limitation is roughly coextensive with a special purpose
or function performed through publication-such as a credit report intended
for a purchaser of the report and not for general circulation 5 -have been
largely untouched by the constitutional privileges. Outside of this limited
publication setting, if mass communication or communication available to
an undifferentiated audience is involved, the constitutional privileges apply
in full force.
The result of the bifurcation of the tort through the concept of publication has been that a wholly distinct set of rules focused on falsity and
fault applies in the mass publication environment. This result, in turn, has
affected various common law concepts that were products of or were shaped
by the publication requirement, such as community perception of reputation,
reasonable interpretation of a potentially ambiguous statement, and innuendo. The impact has taken many forms.
First, because falsity is one of the preconditions to success in all mass
publication settings, 9 the approach to such questions as interpretation,
innuendo, and community perception has been narrowed.6 Interpretation

57. The distinction between media and nonmedia libels was implied in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986). It explicitly was drawn in terms of the purpose and subject of a communication, and
its limited distribution. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985). For a discussion of the private libel category, see supra note 2.
58. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
59. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
60. This is not to say, however, that at common law, courts consistently dealt with
questions of interpretation and meaning in a purely audience and community-based fashion.
Issues of defamation, including reputation and harm to it from an offending statement, often
were treated as questions of law, and direct evidence of audience interpretation, for example,
frequently was not required. Yet even when considered as questions of law, the objective was
to measure community-based perception and understanding. The fact that this was not
consistently accomplished exemplifies one of the many imperfections of the common law, but
not the underlying nature of the inquiry. See PROSSER AND KEroN ON TORTS, supra note 8,
at 773-85. For an insightful and critical analysis of the common law's imperfections in assessing
reputation and harm, see Anderson, supra note 6.
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issues must now be framed in terms of falsity, not perception of reputation.
Perhaps more importantly, falsity is not a community-based issue, and
therefore sensitivity to setting and external perception is no longer a major
factor in the plaintiff's proof or, for that matter, in available defenses. 6 1
The second consequence of the different approach in mass communication settings derives from the requirement that plaintiffs prove fault. Fault
requires proof of publisher intent or state of mind. It is all too easy to
allow a finding of fault, or specific intent, to substitute for issues that
otherwise should be considered in relation to audience definition and audience interpretation. 62 The requirement that plaintiffs prove fault, while
onerous, has the practical effect of relieving them of the burden of direct
proof of defamation and reputational harm in the relevant community in
which publication occurred, and shifts this burden to the defendant. To put
it differently, if the plaintiff can prove that the publisher was aware of and
intended to convey a damaging fact, arguments that a reader or viewer
would not so interpret the statement are left to the defendant, and even if
they are made they are likely to fall on deaf ears. Of course, the publisher
always can claim that it did not intend to convey a given fact by the
statement, but this is dangerous, for if the jury disbelieves the disclaimer
in light of its own interpretation of the offending statement, actual malice

will have been proved. 63
Finally, the separate approach to publication for mass communication
libels has by necessary implication augmented the jury's direct and unassisted
interpretive role, for by definition mass audiences are ambiguous and highly
diverse, and it is in this setting that our understanding of the dynamics of
communication is poorest. If audiences are homogeneous and confined
geographically, culturally, and in time, we have at least some measure of
confidence in our intuition about questions of reputation, interpretation,
and likely harm, and in any event some constraints can be placed on the
evidentiary function. With mass audiences, which are faceless and highly
61. For a discussion of the focus of the libel tort on falsity-related issues at the expense
of concern with actual harm to reputation, see LIBEL LAw AND THE PREss, supra note 21, at
195-200; Barrett, supra note 31, at 853-56. For a discussion of the practical consequences of
focusing on falsity and fault on the adjudication of a recent libel case, see Bezanson & Ingle,
Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemology of Perception in Contemporary Defamation Law,
90 DIcK L. Rv. 585 (1986).
62. An example is Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); see Bezanson
& Ingle, supra note 61.
63. This has become a particular problem in recent libel cases. See, e.g., Brown &
Williamson v. Jacobson, 14 Media L. Rep. 1497 (7th Cir. 1987). If a statement is capable of
being interpreted two ways, one falsely defamatory and the other not, a defendant may choose
to deny any intention to have communicated the defamatory meaning. By such a denial, the
defendant will have implicitly, and often will have explicitly, admitted that the damaging
interpretation would, if intentionally expressed, be clearly false, and knowingly so. The danger
lies in the jury's belief that the damaging interpretation was not intended. If the jury disbelieves
the publisher's statement that the damaging version was not intended, or that the publisher
was unaware that such an interpretation could be given the statement, proof of knowing
publication of false fact will have been established by the defendant's own admission.
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diverse, no limitations on evidence concerning reasonable interpretation,
inference, innuendo, or perception of reputation can be ascertained, much
less enforced, and we know only that the range of possibilities is largely
unlimited 4 The only way to resolve these issues in the mass communication
setting is to treat them as matters of law, as the current approach to the
impenetrable distinction between fact and opinion illustrates, 65 or to leave
jurors discretion to arrive at their own conclusions on the basis of their
personal judgment, assisted by the evidence introduced at trial. Evidence
introduced at trial, however, usually consists only of the text or tape of the
alleged libel, evidence of the publisher's awareness of possible falsity, and
the testimony of the reporter and the plaintiff. Any effort to judge the
highly circumstantial questions of reputation and interpretation in the dynamic context of actual communication effectively is precluded in the mass
communication setting, therefore, and this result is effected both through
the bifurcation of the publication concept and through the emphasis on
falsity and fault which the bifurcation reinforces.
IV.

Ti

CHANGING CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGE

Much already has been said about privileges, especially the constitutional
privileges of negligence and malice, as well as the requirement that plaintiffs
prove falsity, which is something of a privilege and something of a new
element of the public libel tort. I will not repeat here all that previously
has been said about constitutional privileges. Instead, I will discuss the
common law and constitutional privileges in general terms, and explore the
implications of the more monolithic constitutional privileges on the libel
tort today.
Perhaps the most complex and confounding aspects of the common law
libel tort were the privileges. This was not only because of their quantity,
but also because they tended to be highly intricate and based on relatively
subtle determinations. Nonetheless, the common law privileges had at least
one common characteristic: they were discrete and situation-specific, and
reflected a judgment about the social value of particular publication in
limited situations, such as communication between husband and wife, reporting on matters of public record, or evaluative statements on public
issues when the facts underlying the evaluation or conclusion were sufficiently set out that the reader could fairly judge the validity of the evaluative
statement.6 6 The privileges did not, as a general rule, change or in any way
affect the elements of the underlying libel claim, such as the nature or value

64. See Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 61, at 587-91, 600-03.
65. For an example-unfortunately not uncharacteristic-of the approach courts are
taking in attempting to define as a matter of law the distinction between fact and opinion,
see Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
66. For a concise discussion of the various absolute and qualified privileges, see PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 815-39.
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defenses,
of a reputational interest at stake. The privileges were, moreover,
7
with the burden of proof resting squarely on the publisher.
The constitutional privileges are of a very different character. First,
they are more categorical in application, in that they are not based on
discrete and limited publication settings nor on the particular nature and
circumstances of the offending publication, but instead on the identity of
the subject of the publication.68 In all but one respect, the application of
constitutional privilege and the degree of protection it affords depends not
on when and to whom the publication was made, but on whether the
individual subject of the offending statement was a public or private
individual. The only exception to this rule occurs when the application of
any privilege is placed in issue. In such cases, the limited or general
availability of the statement is decisive, although for the large class of
69
media libel cases, this issue is resolved by definition.
Second, unlike the common law privileges, the burden of proof on
issues of constitutional privilege does not rest exclusively on the publisher.
Once the privilege issue is raised, the plaintiff bears at least a share of the
burden on the issue of plaintiff status, and the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving negligence or malice by the heightened clear and convincing
evidence standard.7 0 With respect to the falsity privilege, the plaintiff bears
the full burden of proving that the offending statement was false, although
7
the standard of proof is as yet unclear. '
Because for all practical purposes constitutional privilege is an issue in
all media libel cases, with the only open question being the level of privilege,
the issues of subjective falsity, negligence, or malice tend to dominate the
pretrial and trial processes. 7 2 This is all the more inevitable because the
privileges constitute complete defenses, and consist largely of questions of
law or constitutional fact. Therefore, privilege defenses tend to be raised
immediately, are the subject of motions for summary judgment or dismissal
in virtually all cases, and are substantially adjudicated prior to trial. 73 For

67. Id. at 835. Once privilege was established, of course, the burden shifted to the
plaintiff to prove abuse of the privilege.
68. That is, the privileges depend on whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a private
person, which in turn will determine whether the applicable constitutional privilege is malice
or negligence, respectively, for media or general circulation libels. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1984).
69. See supra note 2.
70. See PROSSER AND

KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 8, at 806-10; R. Sack, supra note
8. The burden of raising privilege "probably" rests on the defendant, to use Keeton's
terminology. Once claimed, the level of privilege is a function of plaintiff status, which is a
matter of law, and at least as a practical matter the plaintiff often bears a large burden in
establishing the lower level of privilege if the issue is contested.
71. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
72. See LmEL LAw AND Tm PRESS, supra note 21, at 104-07, 127-44, 183-91; Franklin,

Winners and Losers, supra note 37.
73. LmIEL LAW AND um PRESS, supra note 21, at 127-44.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:535

those cases that do reach trial, privilege issues continue to dominate the
74
evidentiary and fact-finding processes.
5
Prior to the recent decision in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps
nearly eighty percent of the seriously litigated media libel cases were resolved
prior to trial, and therefore prior to any adjudication of the common law
issues of publication, reputational disparagement, and harm. 76 In almost all
such cases, the basis for decision was privilege; that is, even if the offending
statement was defamatory at common law, no liability could attach because
negligence or malice could not be shown. 77 Even for those cases in which
trials were held, the result of the adjudicatory process was likely to be
78
based on, or to be explainable by, a lack of fault.
Even after Hepps, which requires the plaintiff in most media cases to
allege and prove falsity, fault-based privilege issues are likely to continue
to dominate the pretrial resolution of libel cases. The falsity issue, or
privilege, is dominated by questions of adjudicative fact that are unlikely
to be resolved in advance of trial, especially given the greater evidentiary
difficulty of proving falsity as opposed to truth. In contrast, the fault-based
privileges are much more dominated by questions of law and involve heavy
burdens of proof on factual issues. Fault questions will, therefore, likely
continue to dominate pretrial activity in media libel cases. And while Hepps
promises to make the issue of falsity more dominant in those cases reaching
trial, the ambiguities in the required proof of falsity coupled with the
exonerating effect of the fault privileges may still leave the resolution of
cases that are tried ambiguous, at least in the absence of bifurcated verdicts.
The continued dominance of fault in the resolution of media libel cases
will perpetuate a characteristic of the libel system that may well tend to
encourage libel suits, at least by the most public of the public figure
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding its faults, its cost, and its intrusiveness, today's
libel system virtually assures victory to both parties. For the plaintiffs, the
act of suing itself achieves substantial vindication, and the promise of
punitive awards upon a showing of malice-often a predicate to liability
itself-encourages such plaintiffs and their contingency-fee lawyers to persist
in litigation once suit is commenced. 79 Even for those plaintiffs whose
motives may be impure-those who have been damaged by a true statement-the libel system provides substantial comfort, for a loss in litigation,
even after trial, rarely poses a risk of a straightforward decision on truth.
A loss based instead on lack of malice is, for such plaintiffs, both explainable
and, in an ironic way, face-saving, for such a decision assumes (although

74. Id. at 183-95.
75. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
76. See LIBEL LAW AND n PREss, supra note 21, at 118-44; Franklin, Suing the Media,
supra note 37.
77. See LIBEL LAW AND THE PREss, supra note 21, at 118-44; Franklin, Suing the Media,
supra note 37.
78. LIBEL LAW AND THE PREss, supra note 21, at 183-204.
79. Id. at 92-95.
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without deciding) that the challenged statement was false and damaging,
but not negligently or recklessly published.
Likewise, the fault privileges may encourage media defendants to defend

a libel suit in the face of uncertainty about the accuracy of what was
published, and even in the face of known error. The current libel system
gives media defendants two clear incentives to litigate. First, media defen-

dants almost always win, at least when that issue is judged by the incidence
of success in court. 0 The risk of financial loss through a judgment is slim.
Even in the five to ten percent of the cases that are lost in court, the
awards are relatively small by the time the appellate review process has run
its course. 8'
The second incentive is protection of reputation. Reputation for accuracy

is an important commodity for most media, and it is becoming more
important with expanded commercialization of media. In an increasingly
competitive environment, "reputation" is as important from a marketing
perspective as from a professional one.

tion" into "not admitting

error, '8 3

2

For those who translate "reputa-

the fault privileges provide meaningful

refuge, as the failure of the legal system to address the question of falsity

in the vast majority of cases avoids the embarrassment of admitting error
or apologizing, and allows the dispute to be reformulated by the media into

the safer environment of press freedom.
V.

TnE

LIBEL

TORT TODAY

There is reason to believe that the claims of threatened press freedom
are being viewed with growing skepticism by a public that does not believe
that every libel case involves such issues, and by a public that disbelieves
the implicit assertion of invincibility. 4 There is also reason to believe that

80. Id. at 118-27.
81. Id. at 144-46.
82. Id. at 40-41; see D. Whitney, Begging Your Pardon: Corrections and Corrections
Policies at Twelve U.S. Newspapers, Gannett Center for Media Studies, Working Paper (1986).
83. There are, of course, many other good, or at least understandable, reasons for not
admitting error, including the natural resistance to pressure by news organizations, claims by
allegedly damaged parties that are based on ambiguous assertions of error, and unreasonable
demands for apology when that response is not warranted. There are, as well, libel plaintiffs
who will sue irrespective of the publisher's response. Suffice it to say that there are a
constellation of reasons that might account for a publisher's refusal to apologize or correct,
even if the published facts appear incorrect. The publisher's reputation is but one of the
reasons.
84. A recent Gallup Survey examined public attitudes about libel suits against the press.
Half of the people responding felt that libel suits by public officials were a good thing; ninety
percent said that news organizations should face libel suits if they say something wrong; three
quarters said there should be no liability if what was published were true, but over two-thirds
said the publisher should be liable if the facts are wrong, even if they were believed to have
been true at the time of publication. See Bezanson, Straight Talk About Libel and the Press,
25 IowA ADvoc. 49 (1987). The results of the Gallup Survey are on file with the Iowa Libel
Research Project.
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in some quarters the press is beginning to recognize that admitting trror
when it occurs is more conducive to credibility and reputation than denying
it at every turn. These are hopeful signs, and they suggest that in some
measure, at least, the players in the libel system may begin to address the
libel problem more constructively. Yet the recent evolution of the libel tort
and the libel system has transpired without an awareness of the more
insidious side of the well-intentioned changes that have occurred over the
past quarter-century. The libel system today defines its resolution of libel
disputes in terms of fault, not reputation, its harm, or even falsity. The
parties therefore still have every legal incentive to litigate, because the libel
system's resolution is so ambiguous that both parties can, and do, win.
Perhaps this is as it should be. What more could we ask of a dispute
resolution process than that both parties save face? For my part, however,
I would hope for such a system to be explicit about its objectives, not
silent. I would also hope for a legal system that does not seek to achieve
one goal-protection of reputation-yet fails in every legally explicit measure
to do so. I would not want a legal system based on protecting certain
legally defined reputational interests, but in which the reputational protection
actually achieved is the result of accident, force, or the will of the plaintiff,
and is in no measure a reasoned product of the legal system itself. Finally,
I would prefer a legal system that encourages the parties voluntarily to
resolve their real dispute, and involves the courts only as a last resort,
rather than a system that often provides little incentive to settle claims and
instead may make litigation the remedy of first resort.
These difficulties are not unique to the most recent developments in
libel law. The libel tort always has existed in a setting of charged interpersonal dynamics. Its often byzantine nature has made "rationality" of
litigation an elusive goal, at best. But a fair appraisal of the libel system
from the perspective of the past quarter-century makes clear that the changes
wrought by constitutionalization of the tort have exacerbated the difficulties-have taken us from bad to worse, perhaps-and have extended the
distance between the goals of libel law and what actually occurs in the libel
system today.
Pressure for reform of the libel tort is coming from many quarters,
and takes many forms. The proposals range from elimination of the Sullivan
privileges to the creation of new causes of action, the development of
declaratory judgment remedies, the use of voluntary nonlitigation alternatives, and the practice of bifurcating jury verdicts. 85 Whatever the alternative,
the proposed reforms manifest an increasing level of discomfort with the
existing libel system.
My purpose is not to prescribe a cure for the libel system, however,
but rather to diagnose its condition. It is clear that there exist many possible

85. No effort will be made here to catalog all of the proposed reforms, nor to list their
many authors. Many of the reform proposals are touched upon in Franklin, A Declaratory
Judgment, supra note 45, and Barrett, supra note 31.
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directions for reform, if we are to seek reform, and many of the proposals
mentioned above, as well as countless others, respond to real problems. But
reform must be built on a clear understanding of where we have been, and
where we are today. Therefore my principal purpose is to describe the libel
tort today, and to compare it with the common law tort of yesterday.
While the changes in today's libel tort from the mid-20th Century
common law tort are many, a few are of overriding importance. The
common law tort was premised on protecting reputation, and it achieved
this purpose effectively although imperfectly.8 6 Today the reputational footings of the libel tort are obscure, at best. Fault is the principal driving force
behind liability. What is now important is how, why, and by whom someone
has been impugned, not whether someone has been hurt. More basically,
the tort's central focus on species of falsity has caused a quite remarkable
change in the meaning of the underlying interest in "reputation." Through
the rule of strict liability and the treatment of "truth" as a defense of
justification rather than a negation of reputation, the common law tort was
focused on a community-based idea of an individual's interest in the
perception of self by others. Reputation today is not only more firmly tied
to truth than it was at common law but, more importantly, it is effectively
governed by truth. Community perception and interpretation is today of
marginal significance, if any, because proof of falsity and the subjective
intent of the publisher have been substituted for the difficult and discrete
extrinsic questions of actual reputation and community perception. By
practical consequence rather than logical necessity, "reputation" today
means the individual's freedom from false assertion, a distinctly noncommunity-based idea, and the concept of justification is concentrated on
the issue of factual falsity rather than public interest. "Reputation," in
short, today means an individual's freedom from emotional distress caused
by an intentionally false accusation.
The infusion of fault has changed both the focus of litigation and the
systematic operation of the libel tort. The focus of libel litigation in the
mass media setting is now on blameworthiness. The fault issues are inextricable from the underlying issues of liability, such as reputation and harm.
In part this is because fault questions are, in fact, relevant to those issues,
but they are only relevant in a rough and circumstantial way at best. In
larger part the fault issues are inextricable because evidence of constitutional
fault is compelling in its force and clarity when compared to the less
conclusive forms of direct evidence of reputation and harm. When the
impact of fault is combined with the difficulties of preserving inviolate the
ambiguous questions of harm and compensation, the result is a tort whose
basic character is decidedly punitive.

86. The imperfections, in the view of many, vastly outweighed the benefits. See supra
note 8. The point is not, however, that we should return to the common law tort, nor that it
was a model to which we should revert, but rather that, while imperfect in execution, it did
focus more clearly and cogently on reputation, in theory.
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Finally, the severance of private libel from libel through mass communication has allowed the law of media libel to take its own course, freed
of the moorings of the common law. Ironically, the system of constitutional
privileges has helped loose the common law constraints. It is doubly ironic
that a systematic overview of the operation of the libel tort in the most
constitutionally protected mass communication setting leaves one with the
singular impression that the incidence of liability bears no meaningful
relationship to reputation, compensation, or falsity. This is so, of course,
because in large measure the libel tort no longer concerns any of these
interests.
At least in the mass communication, or media, setting, the libel tort
today represents a very different set of interests from those reflected in the
common law tort. The interests are essentially regulatory and punitive. The
libel tort today represents a civil penalty for general publication in an
irresponsible manner of an injurious falsehood about a person or entity. A
finding of falsity is based on the content of the challenged statement and
the subjective intent of the publisher, not on its meaning as understood in
the real dynamics of actual communication. Injury is premised upon the
logical consequences of the false fact and attendant emotional stress, not
on community-based perceptions of reputation and harm. Irresponsibility is
based on judicially-created standards of journalistic process and editorial
judgment, not on concepts of privilege that reflect social value and abjure
judgments of fault.
Whatever may be said against or in favor of such a tort, it is a far cry
from the common law concepts of reputation, compensation, publication,
and privilege. For those whose interest is in protecting reputation, today's
libel tort fails in almost all respects to do so. It underprotects the communitybased interest in reputation, and overprotects the reputationally-unrelated
interests in truth, responsible journalism, and freedom from emotional harm.
For those whose interest is in protecting the press from unnecessary inhibition and government control of the standards of journalism, today's libel
tort is anathema, for the chief consequence of libel today is inhibition of
the press from violating judicially-crafted standards of journalism. Finally,
for those who placed faith in the privileges created by New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny, today's libel tort must be discouraging, if
not utterly devastating, for it falls substantially short of safeguarding press
freedom and fails to safeguard individual reputation as well.
Whether in our instinct for reform we should return to the imperfectly
realized common law interests or formulate new approaches that depart
from both our present and our past, we need to build change on an
understanding of where we are today and how we got there. For my part,
today's libel tort is profoundly and fundamentally disquieting in a society
that attempts to strike a balance between reputation and freedom of
expression. Change in the libel system is therefore an imperative. But this
should be neither a shocking nor an unsettling conclusion, for change is
the one common thread that extends throughout the libel tort's long and
arduous history.

